1. How the Vulnerability Worked

Docker Hub uses personal access tokens to authenticate users, applications, and automated workflows.

The vulnerability occurred when an account was converted into an organisation and a target user was designated as its owner. During this process, Docker Hub reportedly reassigned an existing PAT to the designated owner without rotating its secret or obtaining the user's consent.

The reported attack sequence was:

1. An attacker created an account and generated a PAT.

2. The attacker converted the account into an organisation.

3. A target user was designated as the organisation owner.

4. Docker Hub reassigned the PAT to the target identity.

5. The attacker could potentially use the original token secret to act as the target user at the registry level.

The core issue was the failure to securely manage the relationship between a credential and the identity it represented.

2. Potential Impact

Depending on the token's permissions, an attacker could potentially:

• Pull private container images.

• Publish unauthorised or modified images.

• Delete repository images.

• Access repositories available to the target identity.

• Disrupt CI/CD pipelines and software deployments.

Why image tampering matters

If an attacker modifies a trusted container image, downstream systems may deploy the altered version without recognising the change.

A malicious image could potentially execute unauthorised code, expose application secrets, or communicate with attacker-controlled infrastructure.

The actual impact depends on whether the image was deployed, the container's privileges, and the security controls protecting the workload.

3. Vulnerability Timeline

DateEventAugust 26, 2024Vulnerable behaviour was introduced.September 30, 2026Docker received a vulnerability report and deployed a fix within four hours.October 2, 2026Affected users and organisation owners were notified.October 8, 2026Transferred PATs were deactivated, subject to stated exceptions.October 13, 2026Public reporting described the vulnerability.

Docker stated that it examined approximately 304,000 pushes made using transferred tokens and found no evidence of exploitation in the activity reviewed.

4. SOC Investigation: What to Check

Security teams should investigate whether registry credentials were misused or trusted images were modified.

Identity and token activity

• Review PAT creation, reassignment, revocation, and deactivation records.

• Investigate unexpected organisation-owner changes.

• Check for unfamiliar authentication activity.

Container registry activity

• Identify unexpected image pushes, deletions, or tag changes.

• Compare image digests against approved release records.

• Review repository access and publication history.

CI/CD and runtime activity

• Identify pipelines that pulled potentially affected images.

• Review deployment logs and running workloads.

• Investigate unexpected processes and outbound connections.

Preserve relevant logs and image metadata before remediation. A suspicious push or digest change warrants investigation but does not, by itself, prove malicious activity.

5. Prevention and Hardening

Organisations should:

• Use narrowly scoped PATs and revoke unnecessary tokens.

• Store credentials in approved secret-management systems.

• Review registry permissions and organisation ownership.

• Pin production deployments to verified image digests.

• Use image signing and provenance verification where supported.

• Monitor unexpected image pushes and repository changes.

• Rotate credentials following suspected exposure.

• Require approval for sensitive CI/CD operations.

6. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TechniqueRelevanceT1078 – Valid AccountsPotential abuse of a token associated with a legitimate identityT1195 – Supply Chain CompromiseRelevant if malicious changes are introduced into software distributed downstream

These mappings apply only when the corresponding behaviour is supported by investigation evidence.

Conclusion

CVE-2026-105445 highlights how improper credential reassignment can become a critical software supply chain risk. By reportedly transferring a PAT to another identity without rotating its secret or obtaining consent, Docker Hub could allow the original token holder to perform registry operations as the target user.

The incident reinforces the importance of secure token management, registry auditing, image integrity verification, and CI/CD monitoring.

Docker reported that the vulnerability was fixed and that its investigation found no evidence of exploitation in the activity examined.

Further Reading

• Docker Official Security Advisory

• BleepingComputer: Docker Hub Vulnerability

• Docker Documentation: Personal Access Tokens

• NIST Secure Software Development Framework